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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
members who are shut out by it.22 However, its logical application
is in cases where it is the only reasonable means of carrying out
the general objectives of the testator; and so, it is submitted, in
such instances it is a rule of necessary interpretation rather than
merely one of "convenience. ' 23 To avoid the consequences of the
rule, the testator (or more properly, the attorney drafting the
will) should state clearly when the class is to close.21
The writer has attempted to explain the new addition to the
long list of rules of construction employed by Wisconsin courts,
and to show that judicious use of such rule is sound. It is felt
that perhaps often in the past the actual problems of construction
have been obscured by the courts' frantic efforts to determine the
testator's purpose in cases where his individual intent was elusive.2 5
It is suggested that once such intent is determined to be beyond
ascertainment with reasonable certainty, the court is most correct
in employing such rules of construction as will effectuate the
probable intent of the average testator 26 and produce a decision
in accordance with sound public policy."
ADRIAN P. ScHOONE
Domestic Relations-Divorce Decree Incorporating Stipulation
That Child Shall Be Reared In A Given Religion-Defendant and
her husband agreed upon a property settlement and upon the cus-
tody of their children the day before the grant of their divorce de-
cree. This agreement gave the custody of their five year old son to
the defendant, and provided that the child be reared in the Roman
Catholic religion. The defendant was Protestant and the husband
was Catholic. Upon the request of the parties to the divorce, this
stipulation was incorporated into the divorce decree. Two years
later the husband filed "Information for Contempt" alleging that
the defendant has been, and is violating the divorce decree, in that
22 See Re Wenmoth's Estate, 37 Ch. Div. 226, 57 L.J. Ch. 649, 57 L.T. 709, 36
Wkly. Rep. 409 (1888).23Annot., 155 A.L.R. 757 (1945).
24 In Casner, op. cit. supra note 16, at 307, it is suggested: "The crying need in
this field of law is not for reform of the courts' technique in handling the
problem in class gifts . . ., nor reform of the precedents followed by the
courts in the solution of the problem of increase in the class membership.
Rather the crying need is for draftsmen, educated to the seriousness and dif-
ficulties of the task they are employed to perform."
25 E.g., in Will of Ehlers, 155 Wis. 46, 143 N.W. 1050 (1913), where after giving
extended cautioning in the use of rules of construction, and belittling their
value, the court concludes: "..... the intention of the testator should prevail
so far as it can be read out of the language used to express it." [Emphasis
supplied.] Query as to what the court would do if such intent could not begleaned from the will, the testator not having anticipated the problem.
26 See note 10 supra.
27 See note 12 supra.
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she has not reared their son in the Catholic religion, has refused
to do so, and has expressed her intention not to comply with that
provision of the decree.
She was found guilty of contempt by the District Court.
Upon her appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court it was held that the
provision of the divorce decree requiring the defendant to rear the
child in the Roman Catholic religion was void for indefiniteness,
and that the alleged violation of that provision was not contempt.
Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W. 2d 491 (Iowa 1956).
In refusing to enforce agreements concerning the religious
education and rearing of children, the American courts have given
a variety of reasons: the court does not have jurisdiction;' it is
against public policy;2 it violates constitutional religious liberty ;3
because of the welfare of the child;4 that the agreement was not
between the parties but was a condition imposed by a higher
power.5
Many American decisions indiscriminately cite English au-
thorities; as does the case at hand, which cites the leading English
case of Andrews v'. Salt, L.R. 8 Ch. 622 (1873). They are indiscrimi-
nate citations because the English decisions arise from a tradition
completely foreign to this country. In place of a guarantee of pro-
tection of religious liberty. England's policy and law were hostile to
the Roman Catholic Church and followed close upon a history of
open persecution and supression.6 Many English cases are markedly
distinguishable on their facts; either one of the parties to the
agreement was dead, 7 or the child had been trained in another
religion for many years.'
Although these cases, both English and American, deal with
an ante-nuptial contract, which was not directly in issue in the
principal case, yet they are relevant and were so considered by
the court.9 If a decree of this kind is not enforceable, not because
of contract considerations, but because of those stated in the prin-
cipal case, will the agreement for the religious education of children
afford any more protection whether the agreement is made before
or after marriage?
1 Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910). The theory is that
equity does not have jurisdiction when no right of property is involved.
2 Ibid.
3 Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307(1920).
4 Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 Atl. 683 (1920).
5 In re Turner, 19 N.J. Eq. 433 (1868).
6 White, Legal Effect of Ante-Nuptial Promises, American Ecclesiastical Re-
view (1932); 29 H.L.R. 485; Hayes, A Political and Cultural History of
Modern Europe p. 175 (2d ed. 1932).
7 in re Nevin, 2 Cr. 299 (1891); In re Clark, L.R.Ch. Div. 817 (1882); An-
drews v. Salt, L.R. 8 Ch. 622 (1873).
s In re Browne, 2 Ir. Ch. Rep. 151 (1852).
9 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W. 2d 491, at 499 (Iowa 1956).
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There are few American decisions on this subject, and the
question is far from settled.'0 New York has met the issue squarely
and has decided that an agreement upon the religious education of
children is enforceable."
Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 100 (1942), was a proceeding
of a wife, separated from her husband, seeking support for herself
and child. The defendant-father countered with a claim that the
wife, by failing to raise their child in the Catholic religion, breached
their ante-nuptial contract, in which she (a Protestant) had
promised to her prospective husband (a Catholic) that any child
born of their marriage would be baptized and educated in the
Catholic religion. The court, in upholding and enforcing the con-
tract, looked to the sacred origin of marriage and the consequence
of it to a Catholic. The court held that because, to a Catholic,
marriage was an indissoluable union that irrevocably changed his
status, and because he was obliged to insure the religious education
of his children, as a prime duty under his Catholic faith, a Catholic
party's contract to accomplish this purpose will be protected under
the law.1
2
"(a) An ante-nuptial agreement providing for the Catho-
lic faith and education of the children of the parties, in
reliance upon which a Catholic has thereby irrevocably
changed the status of the Catholic party, is an enforceable
contract having a valid consideration; (b) the court will take
judicial notice of the religious and moral obligations of the
parties; (c) the spiritual and Catholic training of a child
amid religious persons or institutions of its own faith is
paramount over any material considerations .... 13
With New York in the forefront we have an American precedent
which upholds the enforceability of an agreement for the religious
education of children.
The Lynch case, typifies and spotlights the situation of conflict
current on this question. There is a dissent splitting this court
five to four.
14
10 12 A.L.R. 1153.
" Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, at 298, 183 N.E. 429, at 431 (1932),
"Agreements between parents for a particular sort of religious upbringing
have in general been valid in this country." In re Vardinakis, 160 Misc. 13,
289 N.Y. Supp 355 (1936); Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1942);
Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1947) ; Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y.
136, 123 N.E.2d 812 (1954); (This case is distinguished by the fact that the
child is 12 years old, and he was held therefore, capable of chosing his own
religion. Dissent would hold agreement enforceable even upon a child of this
age).
2 The court by way of dicta said that a parent could compel the education as
a Catholic of a child baptized as a Catholic, even in the absence of a contract
to that effect.
334 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
14 Majority opinion by Chief Justice Thompson; Hays, Larson, Peterson, and
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As to "indefiniteness," which the majority of the court gave as
the principal reason for its decision, but which was never presented
as an issue or urged in the lower court or on appeal, the dissent
answers in these words:
"The fact of being reared in the Roman Catholic re-
ligion is not so unknown or abstruse as to be ununderstand-
able." 15
Then the dissent proceeded to point out that there is a large popu-
lation of Catholics throughout the country, that thousands of in-
stitutions are maintained by them and therefore the defendant
could have arranged for the boy's religious instruction without too
much difficulty.
To the majority's theory that when the parties agreed upon
"religion" they actually had "cultus" in mind, the minority rebutted
by showing that the word "cultus" does not appear in the dictionary
except in the listing of obsolete words.
Although the majority of the court did not base their decision
upon the constitutional question, they considered the decree of the
lower court violative of the first and fourteenth amendments of
the Federal Constitution, in that it interfered with religious free-
dom.'16 This contention was answered by the dissent, which as-
serted that no particular faith is imposed upon the parties, so as
to violate the Constitution, when they, by contract, have imposed
it upon themselves."'
Iowa Code, Sec. 235.3 directs that official agencies when placing
children for adoption ".... shall take into consideration the reli-
gious faith or affiliations of the child or its parents." ' The dissent
contends that there has never been constitutional objection to this
stated public policy, why then should there be such objection
when the parents themselves have agreed upon the question and
have secured its inclusion in the divorce decree.
This case, in presenting either side of the conflict, has synop-
sized the arguments and attitudes upon a question of particular
importance to Roman Catholics. The Catholic contemplating mar-
riage with a non-Catholic must weigh in conscience the probability
of enforcing an agreement for the religious education of the children
of such marriage with binding law of the Church:
Wennerstrum concur; Dissent by Bliss, in which Garfield, Oliver and Smith
concur.
15 78 N.W. 2d. at 504.
16 Id. at 500.
17 Id. at 506.
Is Wisconsin has a similar provision in §48.82(3): "The following persons are
eligible to adopt a minor if they are residents of this state; .... When prac-
ticable, the petitioners shall be of the same religious faith as the natural
parents of the person to be adopted."; as do many other states.
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"The Church most severely forbids everywhere mar-
riages between two baptised persons, one of whom is a
Catholic, the other a member of a heretical or schismatical
sect; and if there is a danger of perversion for the Catholic
party or the offspring the marriage is forbidden also by
Divine law."
Canon 1060.
DAVID A. SCHUENKE
Joinder of Parties: Effect of No-Action Clause Valid in State
Where Insurance Contract Made Upon Joinder of Insurer Under
Section 260.11(1)-A direct action was brought against defendant
non-resident insurer, who had issued an automobile liability policy
in Kansas to a Wisconsin taxicab company, for injuries sustained in
Wisconsin as a result of the negligence of the taxicab company. This
policy contained a "no-action" clause' which is recognized as valid in
Kansas. Upon motion of insurer to dismiss the complaint against
him on the ground that insurer is not a proper party. Held: that an
insurer is not subject to direct action in Wisconsin by the injured
party in view of the construction of Wis. Stats. Sec. 260.11
(1)2 as not permitting direct action in such case before the amount
for which the insurer may be liable has first been determined either
by agreement or by final judgment against the insured. Klabacka v.
Midwestern Automobile Insurance Co., 146 F. Supp. 243 (W.D. Wis.
1956).
The principal case again raises the question of what effect, if any,
Watson v. Emplyoers Liability Assurance Corp.3 has had on the Wis-
consin decision of Ritterbusch v. Sexsinith.4 In the Ritterbusch case
the no-action clause was contained in a policy issued in Massachusetts
where such clause is valid but the party insured resided in Wisconsin.
Our Court held that the no-action clause was effective to postpone di-
1 The standard form of such clause reads: "No action shall lie against the
company until the amount for which the assured is liable by reason of any
casualty covered by this policy is determined by final judgement against the
insured or by agreement between the insured and the plaintiff with the
written consent of the company."
2WiS. STATS. §260.11(1) (1955), the pertinent provision being: . In any
action for damages caused by the negligent operation, management, or con-
trol of a motor vehicle, any insurer of motor vehicles, which had an interest
in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or to any of the
parties to such controversy, or which by its policy of insurance assumes or re-
ceives the right to control the prosecution, defense or settlement of the claim
or action of the plaintiff or any of the parties to such claim or action, or
which by its policy agrees to prosecute or defend such action brought by the
plaintiff or any of the parties to such action or agrees to engage counsel to
prosecute or defend such action, or agrees to pay costs of such litigation is
by this section made a proper party defendent in any action brought by the
plaintiff on account of any claim against the insured."
3 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
4Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W. 2d 611 (1950).
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